have higher poverty rates over the long run because economic growth, the key to poverty reduction, is crippled by excessive redistribution. To assess the merits of this view I focus on the welfare state's long-term effects on absolute poverty rates, though I also examine relative poverty.
The first section outlines existing views and research findings on the relationship between the welfare state and poverty. The second details the data and method I use in the analysis. The third section describes and discusses the results. A brief conclusion follows.
Existing Arguments and Evidence
There is no shortage of proponents of the view that social-welfare policies help to reduce poverty. This notion is at the heart of support for such policies among many scholars, policy makers, and citizens. Yet there is also considerable sentiment for the opposing view, which holds that social-welfare programs do not in fact reduce poverty. Sometimes the argument is, to borrow Albert Hirschman's (1991) useful terminology, one of futility:
redistributive policies are said to be incapable of achieving poverty reduction. In other instances the argument is a stronger one  one of perversity. Here such policies are said to have the perverse effect of increasing the poverty rate. In Alexis de Tocqueville's (1835, p. 70) words: "Any permanent, regular administrative system whose aim will be to provide for the needs of the poor will breed more miseries than it can cure ...."
Critics have focused upon three reasons why social-welfare programs may fail to reduce poverty. One is that too little of the money reaches the poor (Crook 1997; Friedman & Friedman 1979; Lee 1987; Stigler 1970; Tullock 1971) . It is certainly true that a substantial share of government benefits tend to go the middle and upper classes rather than the poor. In the United States, for instance, more than half of the transfer payments and tax benefits dispensed by the federal government in 1991 went to households with incomes over $30,000, which is more than double the poverty cutoff for a family of four (Howe & Longman 1992, p. 93) . And in most other industrialized nations social-welfare programs are even more universal in nature  that is, less targeted toward the poor  than they are in the United States (Castles & Mitchell 1993; Esping-Andersen 1990) .
Nevertheless, enough money reaches the poor that, in the absence of any detrimental effects of social-welfare programs, one would expect them to have at least some povertyreducing impact.
The second line of criticism asserts that redistributive programs do in fact have detrimental effects. In particular, they foster dependence on benefits and thereby increase the poverty rate (Anderson 1978, chap. 2; Butler & Kondratas 1987; Lee 1987; Mead 1986; Murray 1984) . According to this argument, for many poor individuals with little in the way of marketable skills it makes sense financially to live off government transfers rather than take a low-wage job. The welfare system sucks them in, and they become trapped in poverty. The transfers pay enough to keep such individuals alive, but not enough to bring them above the poverty line. Were they to take entry-level jobs, by contrast, they might be able to work their way up the job ladder and eventually escape poverty. Charles Murray (1984) points out that in the United States welfare benefits were increased and eligibility requirements eased in the late 1960s. Shortly thereafter, the welfare rolls grew and the poverty rate stopped falling. After having declined steadily through the 1960s, the U.S. poverty rate leveled off and began to increase slightly starting in the early 1970s.
Murray concludes that this must be due to the perverse incentives created by an excessively generous social-welfare system: "We tried to provide more for the poor and produced more poor instead" (Murray 1984, p. 9 ).
Yet, as is often noted, this argument fails to square with some important facts about welfare and poverty in the United States (see, e.g., Bane & Ellwood 1994; Blank 1997; Ellwood & Summers 1986; Marmor, Mashaw, & Harvey 1990; by facilitating early retirement. In addition, social services have become a significant source of new jobs, helping countries to absorb the rapid increase in female labor force participation of the past few decades. Any adverse impact of income redistribution, such as crowding out of investment or reduction of work effort, may be offset or even outweighed by these and other beneficial effects (Birdsall, Ross, & Sabot 1995; Kenworthy 1995a Kenworthy , 1998 Perotti 1996; Putterman, Roemer, & Silvestre 1998) .
A host of studies have assessed the effect of taxes and/or transfer payments upon labor supply and work effort (Atkinson & Mogensen 1993; Burtless & Haveman 1987; Danziger, Haveman, & Plotnick 1981; Moffitt 1992) . Many of these studies have found a negative impact of transfers, but the magnitude of the effect is unclear. More important, this research has not analyzed the impact of tax and transfer programs on poverty itself.
Detrimental effects of social-welfare policies on labor supply or work effort may be so small that they have no influence on poverty rates, or they may be offset by other, povertyreducing effects of such programs.
Other analyses have examined the relationship between welfare state commitment and economic growth across countries (Atkinson 1995; Castles & Dowrick 1990; Friedland & Sanders 1985; Hansson & Henrekson 1994; Kenworthy 1995b, chap. 4; Korpi 1985; Landau 1985; Marlow 1986; McCallum & Blais 1987; Pfaller with Gough 1991; Weede 1986 ). However, the findings of this research have conflicted due to differing variable measures, time periods, and nations used in the analyses. And again, because these studies do not examine poverty directly, it is not clear what implications can be drawn from them regarding the overall utility of social-welfare policies.
Most studies which do examine the relationship between social-welfare programs and poverty have focused upon a single nation, commonly the United States (Bane & Ellwood 1994; Blank 1997; Danziger, Haveman, & Plotnick 1986; Danziger & Weinberg 1994; Ellwood & Summers 1986; Gottschalk, McLanahan, & Sandefur 1994; Haveman & Scholz 1994; Jencks 1992; Marmor, Mashaw, & Harvey 1990; Murray 1984; Sawhill 1988; Wilson 1987) . This single-country focus has limited their capacity to effectively gauge the impact of social-welfare policies on poverty rates. Variation over time in many other potentially important factors  particularly demographics and the state of the economy  makes it difficult to isolate the effect of the welfare state on poverty. A crossnational approach would be more useful in this respect. To date, however, there has been no careful multivariate cross-national analysis of the relationship between social-welfare policies and poverty. This study attempts to fill this gap.
Data and Method
My aim is to assess, for 15 nations, the impact of social-welfare policies over the period 1960-91 on poverty rates in 1991. The analysis consists of cross-sectional ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions of 1991 (or similar year) post-tax and -transfer poverty rates on three causal variables: social-welfare policy extensiveness (operationalized using three alternative measures) during 1960-91, national wealth (GDP per capita) in 1960, and pretax/transfer poverty rates in 1991. The countries included are Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States. These are 15 of the 18 most affluent OECD-member democracies with populations of at least three million. The other three  Austria, Japan, and New Zealand  cannot be included due to lack of adequate poverty data.
1
Until recently, careful cross-national exploration of the effects of social-welfare programs on poverty has been prevented by a lack of comparable data on the distribution of income in different countries. Such data are now available through the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS). The LIS database consists of microdata (data for individuals and households) on earnings, government transfers, other income sources, and tax payments in various countries. These data can be used to calculate national poverty rates. The most recent year for which data are available for most nations is 1991.
How should poverty be defined? 2 Most cross-national studies use a relative measure of poverty (e.g., Duncan et al. 1995; Forster 1993; McFate, Smeeding, & Rainwater 1995; Mitchell 1991; Smeeding 1991a Smeeding , 1991b Van den Bosch & Marx 1996) .
That is, individuals are classified as poor if their household income is below a certain percentage  typically 40% or 50%  of the median in their country.
The problem with a relative poverty measure is that it may hide indirect, dynamic effects of social-welfare programs  specifically, the possibility that such programs reduce the society's growth rate and therefore hurt the poor over the long run. 3 There is no question but that social-welfare programs reduce poverty in a direct, static sense. By shifting money to those with lower incomes, tax and transfer policies in all industrialized nations bring some individuals above the poverty line, however that line is defined (McFate, Smeeding, & Rainwater 1995; Mitchell 1991; Smeeding 1997) . Indeed, more than one-fifth of all households in such nations rely on government transfers as their major source of income (Atkinson, Rainwater, & Smeeding 1995, p. 83) . The degree of impact varies across countries, of course. Timothy Smeeding (1997, p. 35) have a smaller share of its citizens with post-tax/transfer incomes below 40% of its median.
Yet since the median itself would now be higher in country B, many of those on the lower end of B's income distribution might be better off than their counterparts in A in an absolute sense.
To take into account the indirect, dynamic effects of social-welfare programs, it is more useful to employ an absolute measure of poverty. This involves selecting a particular monetary figure for the poverty line and applying that line to all countries.
How exactly are absolute poverty rates calculated? I begin with LIS data on posttax and -transfer household income. 4 Unlike the official U.S. poverty measure, this measure takes into account both government benefits (including "near cash" benefits, such as food stamps) and tax payments. These income figures are then adjusted for household size, using an equivalency scale of .5. Specifically, this adjustment is made by dividing household post-tax/transfer income by S .5 , where S represents the number of persons in the household. This presumes that larger households enjoy economies of scale in their use of income, so that, for instance, a household of four needs only twice as much income as a household of one, rather than four times as much (see Atkinson, Rainwater, & Smeeding 1995; Smeeding 1997) . 5 I use 40% of the 1991 median post-tax/transfer household (sizeadjusted) income in the United States as the poverty line. This is an arbitrary choice; but it approximates the poverty line used by the U.S. government, which is one of the few governments that calculates an official poverty rate (Citro & Michaels 1995; Smeeding 1997) . I adjust household incomes in eight of the 15 nations for inflation (using changes in each nation's consumer price index, from OECD 1995) because their income data were collected in a year other than 1991. I then use 1991 purchasing power parities (PPPs, from OECD 1996, p. 159) to convert incomes from the various national currencies into U.S.
dollars. 6 The poverty rate for each nation is calculated as the percentage of individuals living in households with incomes lower than 40% of the 1991 U.S. median. 7 To check the sensitivity of the results to the particular poverty line chosen, I also calculate poverty rates using 50% and 30% of the U.S. median.
These absolute poverty rates are shown in Table 1 . Despite the fact that it is the richest nation and has the highest median income, the United States does not have a low rate of absolute poverty. Instead, it has one of the highest, exceeded only by those of Italy and three other "Anglo" countries  Ireland, Australia, and the United Kingdom. 8 The lowest rates are found in Norway, Finland, Switzerland, and Germany, with Sweden, Denmark, Belgium, and Canada not far behind. The rate for any given country varies considerably depending upon the particular income level selected as the poverty line (50% or 40% or 30% of the U.S. median), but the differences across countries vary only minimally: the three measures correlate between .85 and .96 with one another.
- Table 1 This is perhaps the most useful overall measure, and it is certainly the most widely used.
Average transfer levels for the 15 nations over the period 1960-91 are shown in Table 2 .
Not surprisingly, the smaller social democratic, corporatist European nations along with
France have had the most extensive transfer programs, while those in the Anglo nations and Switzerland have been the least extensive.
- Table 2 about here -
The second measure is Gosta Esping-Andersen's (1990, p. 52) decommodification scale. This scale taps the degree to which individuals "can uphold a socially acceptable standard of living independently of market participation" (Esping-Andersen 1990, p. 37). It takes into account the rules governing access to pension, sickness, and unemployment benefits, the degree of income replacement provided by those benefits, and the range of entitlements they encompass. Decommodification is a more multifaceted, and thus arguably a better, measure of social-welfare commitment than the share of GDP spent on government transfers. Its chief drawback is that it is measured at only a single point in time  the year 1980. As Table 2 indicates, the highest degree of decommodification is achieved by the Scandinavian welfare states, followed by those of the continental European nations and Japan, with the United States and the other Anglo countries again scoring
lowest. Yet the country scoring for decommodification differs notably from that for government transfers. The two measures correlate at only .58 for the 15 countries.
The third measure of social-welfare policy extensiveness is the "social wage"  the percentage of former income that a median-income worker will receive if she or he stops working. Sources of this income include unemployment compensation, general public assistance, and related programs. These data are available from the OECD (forthcoming)
for each of the 15 countries for every other year over the 1960-91 period. 11 This measure focuses more directly than do the other two on benefits available to the working-age population. That is an advantage in that this is the group welfare state critics suggest will be most negatively affected by the work disincentives associated with social-welfare programs, which in turn are said to hurt the poor by reducing economic growth. Yet that same focus precludes this measure from taking into account the benefits that other types of social-welfare programs may provide for the young or elderly poor. As the figures in Table   2 indicate, the rank-ordering of countries for the social wage is similar yet differs somewhat from those for government transfers and decommodification. The social wage measure correlates .60 with the former and .57 with the latter.
If proponents of social-welfare policies as an anti-poverty tool are correct, the regression analysis should yield a statistically significant negative coefficient for the socialwelfare policy extensiveness variable  whichever of the three measures is used. Table 2 .
Second, cross-national poverty rates may vary because the distribution of pretax/transfer income is more unequal in some countries than in others. Some nations have larger shares of citizens working in low-paying jobs, higher unemployment rates, more labor force dropouts, larger elderly populations, and/or more single-parent families. Each of these features can be expected to produce more households with earnings below the poverty level, which, ceteris paribus, will result in a higher post-tax/transfer poverty rate. I therefore include a variable representing pre-tax and -transfer absolute poverty rates, which can be calculated from the LIS database. 13 As Table 2 indicates, pre-tax/transfer poverty is highest in Ireland and France and lowest in Norway, Finland, Switzerland, and Germany.
Because it is so commonly used in cross-national research on poverty, I also analyze the relationship between social-welfare policy extensiveness and poverty using a relative poverty measure. Table 3 shows rates of relative poverty after and before taxes/transfers in the 15 countries, using 40% of the median within each nation as the poverty line. For most countries relative rates of post-tax/transfer poverty are lower than absolute rates. Indeed, relative poverty measured using the 40%-of-the-median line is less than 7% in every nation except the United States. That the United States has the highest rate of relative poverty is not especially surprising given the extensive earnings inequality that characterizes the American economy (Gottschalk & Smeeding 1997 ).
- Table 3 about here -
Results
Regression results for analyses of cross-national variation in absolute poverty are shown in Table 4 . The coefficients for each of the three alternative social-welfare policy extensiveness measures are negative and statistically significant at or near the .01 level.
This suggests that social-welfare policies do help to reduce poverty, even when indirect, dynamic effects are taken into account. The unstandardized coefficient in the equation with government transfers used as the social-welfare policy measure indicates that, on average for these 15 nations, each additional 1% of GDP spent on transfers over the period 1960-91 may have reduced the absolute poverty rate in the early 1990s by as much as .75 percentage points.
- Table 4 about Although the aim here is not to develop a full model or explanation of poverty, it is worth noting that, irrespective of how social-welfare policy extensiveness is measured, this simple three-variable model accounts for two-thirds or more of the variation in posttax/transfer absolute poverty rates (after adjusting for degrees of freedom).
Given the small sample size, the results of this analysis may be highly sensitive to outlier cases or to the particular way in which the variables are measured. A variety of analyses were performed to assess the robustness of the findings. The results of these analyses are not shown here, but they are available from the author.
A simple way to check for outliers is via the jackknife diagnostic (see Mooney & Duval 1993) There is another potential problem related to the measurement of social-welfare policy extensiveness. It could be the case that nations with more generous redistributive programs between, say, 1945 and 1960 grew more slowly during that time and consequently had lower per capita GDPs in 1960, and that this in turn caused these countries to have higher absolute poverty rates by the early 1990s. Were that the case, the finding of social-welfare programs' beneficial effect would be undermined. Unfortunately, there is no way to check this, because good comparative data on government transfers, decommodification, and the social wage are not available prior to 1960. But it is almost certainly not the case, since the 1960 per capita GDP variable is not statistically significant in any of the regressions in Table 4 .
Do the results differ if a relative measure of poverty is used instead of an absolute one? To find out, I ran the analysis using the post-tax/transfer relative poverty rates shown in Table 3 as the dependent variable. Table 5 Yet it might be objected that the model I have used here is misspecified and, as such, misleading. According to this argument, the potential availability of government transfers encourages some individuals to leave (or never enter) the labor force. Although the transfers they then receive may shift them from pre-tax/transfer poverty to posttax/transfer nonpoverty, in the absence of such transfers some or many of these persons would work (or work more) and thus would not have pre-tax/transfer incomes below the poverty level. In short, social-welfare policies reduce poverty that they caused in the first place.
While it is almost certainly true that government transfers tend to have some workreducing effect, the numerous studies of this issue differ widely regarding its magnitude, and some suggest it may be quite minimal (see, e.g., Atkinson & Mogensen 1993; Burtless & Haveman 1987; Danziger, Haveman, & Plotnick 1981; Moffitt 1992 ). For our purposes, the question is whether the effect is so substantial as to be a major cause of pre-tax/transfer poverty. If it is, then the pre-tax/transfer poverty variable should not be included in an analysis of the causes of post-tax/transfer poverty, because including it may hide the detrimental (or at least nonbeneficial) effects of the social-welfare policy extensiveness variable.
The data from the 15 countries suggest, however, that this is not the case. A regression of post-tax/transfer absolute poverty (using, as before, 40% of the U.S. median as the poverty line) on just government transfers and 1960 per capita GDP  i.e., leaving out the pre-tax/transfer poverty variable  yields a coefficient for the government transfers variable that is negative and significant at the .10 level. The results are similar for each of the other two measures of social-welfare policy extensiveness. More to the point, though, the correlation between government transfers and pre-tax/transfer poverty is only .18, which, although positive, is not significantly different from zero. For the social wage and pre-tax/transfer poverty the correlation is just .06, and for decommodification and pretax/transfer poverty it is negative, at −.24. This suggests that more extensive government transfers may not increase pre-tax/transfer poverty rates at all, and that even if they do they are far from being the principal determinant. That in turn suggests that the pre-tax/transfer poverty variable should be included in the regressions. Including it may perhaps overstate the beneficial impact of social-welfare policies on post-tax/transfer poverty somewhat, but probably not by much.
Concluding Remarks: Why the United States Is Different
The failure of existing social-welfare programs to make any headway in reducing the poverty rate in the United States since the early 1970s has led to growing frustration among voters and policy makers. 14 This dissatisfaction is heightened by stagnant wages, growing job instability, and ever more intense global economic competition, all of which accentuate the perception that high tax rates and generous government benefits are no The analysis here suggests that, contrary to the view of skeptics, social-welfare policies do help to reduce poverty. Part of the reason why the backlash against the welfare state has been so fierce in the United States is that American social-welfare programs are less effective than those in most of the other 14 nations examined here. Figure 1 shows early 1990s absolute poverty rates (with the poverty line set at 40% of the U.S. median income) for these countries before and after taxes and transfers. Clearly the tax/transfer system in the United States is comparatively ineffectual at reducing the incidence of poverty. Why is that?
- Figure 1 about hereIts general stinginess is one obvious causal candidate. As Table 2 above showed, the United States had the second lowest (after Australia) level of transfers as a share of GDP over the 1960-91 period among these 15 countries. Yet this does not tell the whole story. Even in nations with transfer levels similar to the U.S., redistributive policies tend to do a better job at reducing poverty. Canada provides a particularly telling comparison. The
United States and Canada are nearly identical in both pre-tax/transfer poverty and government transfer expenditures' share of GDP, yet the U.S. post-tax/transfer poverty rate is nearly double that of Canada. This seems to be due to the fact that Canada's socialwelfare programs are more generous than those in the United States in several areas where such generosity is particularly helpful in reducing poverty (see Myles 1996; Smeeding 1992 ). For instance, unlike AFDC, Canada's principal means-tested welfare program, social assistance, is available to individuals and couples without children, and the benefit levels are substantially higher. In contrast to the U.S. Earned Income Tax Credit, Canada's child tax benefit is available not just to working families but to nonworking ones as well.
Canada provides a guaranteed income supplement to the elderly which ensures that elderly individuals and couples have an income no less than 55-60% of the nation's median; in the United States, supplemental security income (SSI) and food stamps ensure the elderly an income only 35-40% of the median. Canada also provides a special widows' benefit to assist elderly women living alone, who comprise the largest single poverty group, whereas the United States has no such program.
The most noteworthy development in American social-welfare policy in recent years, the replacement of AFDC by Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF) in 1997, will likely lead to an overall reduction in expenditures on welfare programs as well as -20-a shift of more welfare recipients into the workforce. Given the low pay levels associated with the types of jobs these individuals are likely to get, it would be surprising if this shift results in much, if any, reduction of the poverty rate (Bernstein & Mishel 1995; Blank 1997; Edin & Lein 1996) . Yet the differential success of Canada and the United States in reducing poverty despite similar overall levels of redistribution suggests that increased social-welfare policy effectiveness may be possible without a substantial rise in expenditures. Relatively modest increases in benefit levels for programs that assist nonworking individuals and low-income workers might well be sufficient to bring the United States into line with at least a few of the other affluent nations in its degree of poverty reduction.
Notes
1 No LIS data have been collected for Japan or New Zealand. The LIS data for Austria are rendered problematic by omission of self-employment income.
2 For helpful overviews of differing approaches, see Atkinson (1991) ; Citro and Michael (1995); Smeeding (1997) .
3 Another drawback of a relative measure is that it renders poverty merely a component of income inequality. As McKinley Blackburn (1994, p. 372) Smeeding 1997, p. 5) finds that the rank-ordering of poverty rates among nations does not change when such non-cash transfers are counted.
Taxes include personal income and employee payroll, but not sales or VAT. 5 Poverty differences are somewhat, but not terribly, sensitive to the particular equivalence scale used. See Atkinson, Rainwater, and Smeeding (1995, p. 52); Blackburn (1994, p. 374) . 13 In the LIS database this variable is called "market income," or "MI." Like the LIS data for post-tax/transfer poverty, these figures must be adjusted for household size and converted to 1991 U.S. dollars.
14 In 1975, 45% of General Social Survey (GSS) respondents felt the U.S. federal government spent too much money on welfare programs. By 1996, 58% felt that way. Note. Standardized and unstandardized OLS regression coefficients, with absolute tvalues in parentheses. Dependent variable is post-tax/transfer absolute poverty circa 1991, with the poverty line set at 40% of the U.S. post-tax/transfer median (see Table 1 ). * p < .10 ** p < .05 *** p < .01 (one-tailed tests) Note. Standardized and unstandardized OLS regression coefficients, with absolute tvalues in parentheses. Dependent variable is post-tax/transfer relative poverty circa 1991, with the poverty line set at 40% of the post-tax/transfer median within each country (see Table 1 ). * p < .10 ** p < .05 *** p < .01 (one-tailed tests)
